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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is an independent international criminal 
court.
1
 This Court, despite being a judicial organ, has a relationship with the United 
Nations Security Council (SC), an intergovernmental political body.
2
This is 
intriguing and unusual when contrasted with the position at the domestic level where 
the doctrine of separation of powers or trias politica applies.
3
 Organs within the legal 
and political field which should normally be separate at the domestic level often 
work jointly and have overlapping duties at the international level.
4
 This is evidenced 
by the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) and 
the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia (ICTY) which were instituted 
through SC Resolutions.
5
 The ICC differs from these tribunals in that its interaction 
with the SC is based on its governing statutory instrument, the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (RS),
6
 as well as the Relationship Agreement between 
the Court and the United Nations (UN).
7
  
 
However, the interaction of law and politics can lead to problems and is contentious 
since the legitimacy of institutions which are linked to political bodies is subject to 
scrutiny by the international community.
8
 The consequential problems emanating 
from the linkages between law and politics in the international sphere will be 
examined in this dissertation. In particular, the SC referral mechanism to the ICC and 
its associated problems will be explored. The primary focus will be an investigation 
of the procedure used to refer a situation to the ICC, provided in Article 13 (b) of the 
Rome Statute. This provision which enables third parties, non-State Parties,
9
 to be 
bound to the ICC by virtue of an SC referral as well as other consequential effects 
                                                          
1
 Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). 
2
 Preamble & Article 1 of the Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal 
Court and the United Nations, ICC-ASP/3/Res.1 (2004) ( Relationship Agreement).  
3
 B.C. Mubangizi & N. Tshishonga ‘Political and community oversight for good governance in South 
Africa’(2013)48  Journal of Public Administration 299 at 306. 
4
 Franklin Berman ‘The Relationship between the International Criminal Court and the Security 
Council’ in  Herman A.M. von Hebel, Johan G. Lammers & Jolien Schukking (eds) Reflections on the 
International Criminal Court: Essays in Honour of Adriaan Bos (1999) 175. 
5
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 S/RES/827 (1993) established the ICTY; United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1315 S/RES/1315 (2000) established the ICTR. 
6
 Article 13(b) of its Rome Statute provides a legal basis for the SC to refer situations to the 
International Criminal Court. 
7
 Preamble & Article 1 of the Relationship Agreement. 
8
 Berman op cit note 4 at 175. 
9
 Article 2 (1)(h) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT). 
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will be analysed. In addition, the effect of an SC referral at the vertical and horizontal 
level will be evaluated. The vertical level involves the SC’s competence to impose 
measures on states and institutions such as the ICC. The horizontal level relates to 
how SC decisions affect the relationship between states.  
  
1.1 Background  
The ICC is an international criminal court that was established and is subsequently 
governed by a treaty specifically referred to as the Rome Statute of the ICC.
10
 The 
ICC is therefore a treaty-based institution.
11
 The Rome Statute, being a treaty, is 
subject to the established principles of the law of treaties.
12
 The ICC is also bound to 
the general rules of the law of treaties because it is governed by a treaty, the Rome 
Statute, and is a treaty-based institution.
13
 The Rome Statute, as with other treaties, 
was brought into existence through negotiation by States Parties.
14
 The State Parties 
to the ICC therefore played a large role in defining the rules and regulations that 
would govern the ICC. 
 
States Parties to the ICC had a responsibility, in the drafting process, to ensure that 
the provisions of the Rome Statute were in accordance with widely recognised 
principles of the law of treaties.
 
States Parties to the Rome Statute also had a 
responsibility to ensure that provisions of the RS were not inconsistent with 
international peremptory norms which are binding on all states.
15
 This is important 
since treaties create rights and obligations for States Parties and should therefore not 
establish obligations that violate jus cogens and other established principles of 
international law.
16
  
                                                          
10
 Article 1 of the Rome Statute; Hugh Thirlway The Sources of International Law (2014) 195. 
11
 Jens David Ohlin ‘Peace, Security and Prosecutorial Discretion’ in Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter 
(eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009) 187. 
12
 Hugh Thirlway ‘Treaty Law and the Law of Treaties in Recent Case-Law of the International Court’ 
in Dr. M. Craven & Prof. M. Fitzmaurice (eds) Interrogating the Treaty: Essays in the Contemporary 
Law of Treaties (2005) 7; Jan Klabbers The Concept of Treaty in International Law (1996) 38-39. 
13
 Article 1 of the Rome Statute; Thirlway op cit note 10 at 195; Ohlin op cit note 11 at 187. 
14
 Antonio Cassese International Criminal Law (2008) 340-3. 
15
 Klabbers op cit note 12 at 38-39. 
16
 Ibid at 2 & 38-39. 
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Against this backdrop, the RS should be in accordance with general principles of the 
law of treaties such as pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.
17
 This principle stipulates 
that treaties cannot bind third parties, non-State Parties,
18
 that have not expressed 
consent to be bound to a treaty.
19
State consent is an important principle in 
international law which is linked with sovereignty and the principle of autonomy.
20
 A 
state cannot be bound to a treaty without expressing its consent.
21
 The RS should 
therefore be legally binding towards State Parties to the RS only. However, the RS 
claims to be applicable to third parties by virtue of an SC referral within Article 13 
(b) of the Rome Statute.
22
 
 
The SC has at present referred two situations to the ICC through Resolutions 1593 
(2005) and 1970 (2011), which addressed the situations in Sudan and Libya 
respectively.
23
 These referrals were issued against third parties, ie non-State Parties 
to the RS.
24
 According to the law of treaties these states should not be bound to 
comply with the provisions of the RS.
25
 Nevertheless, the ICC was able to obtain 
jurisdiction in these cases through the use of the SC’s Chapter VII powers as 
stipulated under Article 13 (b) of the RS.
26
 Resolution 1593 (2005) will be used as an 
example to analyse the procedure of referring a situation to the ICC through Article 
13 (b) of the Rome Statute. This Resolution was selected since it is especially 
                                                          
17
 Malgosia Fitzmaurice ‘Third Parties and the Law of Treaties’ (2002) 6 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 37 at 38. 
18
 Article 2 (1)(h) of the VCLT. 
19
 Fitzmaurice op cit note 17 at 38. 
20
 Dapo Akande ‘Prosecuting Aggression: The Consent Problem and the Role of the Security Council’ 
(2010) Oxford Institute For Ethics, Law, And Armed Conflict: Working Paper at 13, available at 
http://www.elac.ox.ac.uk/downloads/dapo%20akande%20working%20paper%20may%202010.pdf, 
accessed on 13 March 2017. 
21
 Ibid. 
22
 Hans-Peter Kaul ‘The International Criminal Court- Its Relationship to Domestic Jurisdictions’ in 
Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter (eds) The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (2009) 
33; Dapo Akande ‘The Effect of Security Council Resolutions and Domestic Proceedings on State 
Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 299 at 305. 
23
 International Criminal Court ‘Situations under investigation’ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx, accessed on 13 March 2017. 
24
 Article 2 (1)(h) of the VCLT. 
25
 Fitzmaurice op cit note 17 at 38; Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 
1969 (VCLT). 
26
 International Criminal Court ‘Situation in Darfur, Sudan’ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/darfur, accessed on 13 March 2017; International Criminal Court ‘Situation in Libya’ available 
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/libya, accessed on 13 March 2017. 
9 
 
contentious, as the ICC issued arrest warrants for a number of accused persons 
including Sudan’s incumbent President Omar Al-Bashir.27  
 
The ICC issued two arrest warrants in respect of President Omar Al-Bashir.
28 
He was 
charged with ten counts, namely, five counts of crimes against humanity, two counts 
of war crimes and three counts of genocide.
29 
The case against President Omar Al-
Bashir is controversial since it involves a third party, a state that is not party to the 
RS.
 
Also, it deals with a sitting head of state, who is normally shielded from 
prosecution by virtue of immunity grounded in customary international law (CIL).
30
  
 
The case involving President Al-Bashir will be used to investigate the ICC’s 
competence in having jurisdiction over third parties. This, as well as its ability to 
override CIL, specifically Al-Bashir’s immunity, will be explored. Moreover, the 
effect of SC referrals at the vertical and horizontal levels will be analysed. The 
exploration at the horizontal level will be narrowed to the examination of Al-Bashir’s 
immunity. The case against Al-Bashir has been contentious and raised issues around 
whether his immunity was lifted by the SC. 
  
The controversial nature of the case and the discrepancy over whether Al-Bashir’s 
immunity was removed is evident in the widespread non-compliance it has received. 
States Parties’ non-compliance with the warrant to arrest and surrender Al-Bashir has 
led to the failure to bring the accused before the Court.
31
 Despite the fact that the ICC 
issued the warrants in 2009 and 2010, at present Al-Bashir is still at large.
32
At the 
moment, nine State Parties, namely Sudan, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad, Uganda, Djibouti, 
Malawi, Democratic Republic of Congo and South Africa have failed to cooperate 
                                                          
27
 International Criminal Court ‘Situation in Darfur, Sudan’ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/darfur, accessed on 13 March 2017. 
28
 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March 2009 p.7-8; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 
Second Decision on the Prosecution's Application for a Warrant of Arrest, ICC-02/05-01/09-94, 12 
July 2010 p.28. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Cassese op cit note 14 at 264. 
31
 International Criminal Court ‘Al Bashir Case’ available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir, 
accessed on 13 March 2017 President Al-Bashir is still at large.  
 
32
 Al Bashir supra note 28; International Criminal Court ‘Al Bashir Case’ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/darfur/albashir, accessed on 13 March 2017 President Al-Bashir is still at large. 
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with the ICC’s request for the arrest and surrender of President Al-Bashir.33 Malawi, 
Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan have been referred to the ASP and 
SC according to Article 87 (7) of the RS which allows for such a finding.
34
  
 
South Africa will be used as a point of reference in analysing the effect of SC 
referrals at the horizontal level. What will be determined is whether Resolution 1593 
removed the immunity of Al-Bashir and, if so, whether this abrogation filters down 
to states. Examination will primarily centre on whether the CIL obligation for states 
to respect the immunity of another state is removed by SC referrals. South Africa 
was selected since it is the latest State to fail to arrest and surrender President Al-
Bashir to the ICC.
35
 Also, its failure to arrest and surrender has led to a number of 
domestic judgements in the High Court, Supreme Court and Constitutional Court.
36
 
Furthermore, the Al-Bashir arrest saga could have influenced South Africa’s decision 
                                                          
33
 The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Cooperation of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, ICC-02/05-
01/09-195, 09 April 2014 para.34 & para.20 (President Al-Bashir has visited Kenya, Nigeria without 
being arrested); The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the Non-compliance of 
the Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and 
Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-151, 26 March 2013 para.23; The 
Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute 
on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the 
Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-
139, 12 December 2011, para. 47; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Request for a Finding of Non-Compliance Against the Republic of the Sudan, ICC-02/05-
01/09-227, 09 March 2015 para.19; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the 
non-compliance by the Republic of Djibouti with the request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir 
to the Court and referring the matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the 
State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC-02/05-01/09-266, 11 July 2016, para.16; The Prosecutor v. 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Decision on the non-compliance by the Republic of Uganda with the 
request to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and referring the matter to the United 
Nations Security Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC-02/05-01/09-
267, 11 July 2016 para.15; The International Criminal Court ‘Al Bashir case: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II 
schedules a hearing on South Africa’s cooperation on 7 April 2017’ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1264 , accessed on 13 March 2017. 
 
34
 Al-Bashir (Malawi) supra note 33 at para. 47; Al-Bashir (Chad) supra note 33 at para.23; Al-Bashir 
(Congo) supra note 33 at para.34; Al-Bashir (Sudan) supra note 33 at para.19. 
 
35
 The International Criminal Court ‘Al Bashir case: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II schedules a hearing on 
South Africa’s cooperation on 7 April 2017’ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1264 , accessed on 13 March 2017. 
36
Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others 
(27740/2015) [2015] ZAGPPHC 402; 2016 (1) SACR 161 (GP); 2015 (5) SA 1 (GP); [2015] 3 All SA 505 
(GP); 2015 (9) BCLR 1108 (GP) (24 June 2015) para.39; The Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre (867/15) [2016] ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016) 
para.124; Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v. Southern Africa Litigation 
Centre (CCT 75/16) para.47. 
11 
 
to withdraw from the ICC.
37
 South Africa filed a declaration of withdrawal on the 
16
th
 of October 2016.
38
 However, the High Court of South Africa recently held that 
the withdrawal, filed without Cabinet approval, was unconstitutional and invalid, and 
ordered the Executive to revoke its declaration of withdrawal.
39
As a result, South 
Africa is still a State Party bound to comply with ICC decisions;
40
 including the 
obligation to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir - an obligation which arose 
through the issuing of the arrest warrants against him by the ICC.
41
 Moreover, even 
if the withdrawal had been valid, it would only take effect after a full year therefore 
obligations which arose before the submission of the declaration of withdrawal 
would remain valid, during this period.
42
 The controversy surrounding the South 
African withdrawal attempt and the domestic cases before its domestic courts make 
the use of this State as an example interesting.  
 
The main issues, centre on the legality of Article 13 (b) of the RS and the effects of 
SC referrals at the vertical and horizontal levels, are analysed through the lens of 
Article 13 (b) of the RS. This means that the exploration will focus on the legality of 
using this provision as a legal basis on which to violate the law of treaties and CIL. 
In other words, the investigation will centre on whether the ICC can lawfully use the 
SC to perform tasks which it is unable to carry out itself, such as violating the law of 
treaties and CIL. The relationship between the ICC and the SC will be examined 
below in greater detail to analyse the nature of the connections between these two 
bodies.  
 
a. Relationship agreement between ICC and SC 
Although a relationship between the ICC and the SC is evident from Article 13 (b), 
Article 2 of the RS makes this relationship explicit. It simply states that the ICC and 
the UN need to establish an agreement to bring the two bodies into a relationship. 
                                                          
37
 The International Criminal Court ‘Minister of Justice of South Africa visits the International Criminal 
Court, meets with Court President’ available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=PR1256, accessed on 13 March 2017. 
38
 Article 127 (2) of the RS. 
39
 Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others (Council for 
the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening) (83145/2016) [2017] ZAGPPHC 53 
(22 February 2017) para.81 & 84. 
40
 Article 86 of the Rome Statute. 
41
 Al Bashir supra note 28. 
42
 Article 127 (1) of the RS. 
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The Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International Criminal Court 
and the United Nations (Relationship Agreement) came into force on 4 October 
2004.
43
It was established and entered into force after approval by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (GA) as well as the Assembly of State Parties to the 
ICC (ASP).
44
 
 
The purpose of the Relationship Agreement is to define the relations and liaisons 
between the ICC and the UN.
45
 It is, prima facie, a legal basis for the relationship 
between the UN and the ICC. The full relationship is expressed when Article 2 of the 
RS and Article 1 of the Relationship Agreement are read jointly. The SC, being a UN 
organ,
46
 is also brought into relationship with the ICC through this Relationship 
Agreement.
47
 This is implied as the relationship between the UN and the ICC would 
likely extend to include organs of the UN such as the Security Council, as they are 
also part of the UN.
 
 
 
The principles guiding the interaction between the ICC and the UN include the need 
to ‘…respect each other’s status and mandate….’ and act in accordance with each 
body’s statutory instrument: the RS and the UN Charter respectively.48 The ICC’s 
independence and legal personality are also recognized as a principle.
49
 The UN and 
the ICC also agree to cooperate with each other as far as necessary for the purpose of 
meeting common objectives and in accordance with their respective governing 
instruments.
50
 
 
Provisions such as Article 13 (b) of the RS reflect the cooperation between these two 
bodies since the SC uses the referral mechanism to the ICC as a method of 
                                                          
43
 International Criminal Court, Negotiated Relationship Agreement between the International 
Criminal Court and the United Nations available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=icc-un-rel-agr, accessed on 13 March 2017. 
44
 Article 2 of the Rome Statute; Article 23 of the Relationship Agreement. 
45
 Article 1(1) of the Relationship Agreement.  
46
 Article 7 (1) of the UN Charter. 
47
 Article 1 of the Relationship Agreement establishes the relationship between the UN and the ICC.  
48
 Article 2 (2) (3) of the Relationship Agreement. 
49
 Article 2 (1) of the Relationship Agreement. 
 
50
 Article 3 of the Relationship Agreement. 
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implementing decisions made whilst acting under its Chapter VII powers.
51
As a 
result, the ICC plays a role in the maintenance and restoration of international peace 
and security since the SC adopts decisions under its Chapter VII powers for this 
purpose.
52
 The ICC’s impact on the maintenance and restoration of international 
peace and security has been confirmed in academia.
53
  
 
Moreover, Article 17(1) of the Relationship Agreement specifically outlines the 
relationship between the ICC and the SC in terms of information sharing with respect 
to situations where the crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are alleged to have 
been committed. The Relationship Agreement thus lists the links between the ICC 
and the UN in respect of a number of matters including cooperation, information 
sharing, and the governing principles regulating their work. Other regulated matters, 
in this agreement, include financing and procedural issues relating to the 
enforcement and implementation of the Agreement.
54
  
 
The SC and Article 13 (b) of the RS are specifically mentioned only in Article 17 (1) 
of the Relationship Agreement. However, as aforementioned, this is done in respect 
of cooperation arrangements relating to information sharing procedures once the 
referral procedure is triggered. It does not describe the complex intricacies of the 
interactions between these two bodies. Article 17 (1) of the Relationship Agreement 
read together with Article 13 (b) of the RS, sets out a skeletal statutory framework. 
For the sake of clarity, it is preferable to have a complete picture of the referral 
mechanism and the relations between the ICC and the SC.  
 
Further investigation into this unique arrangement is required, beyond the parameters 
of the basic statutory framework. The relationship between the ICC and the SC can 
be better observed through analysis of the practice of referring situations to the ICC. 
This will be conducted through an analysis of Resolution 1593 (2005) which referred 
                                                          
51
 Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute specifies that the Security Council refers a situation acting under 
its Chapter VII powers which means that the ICC works conjunctively with the Council to enforce the 
decisions of the Council before the Court. 
52
 Article 24 & Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
53
 Luigi Condorelli & Santiago Villalpando ‘Relationship of the Court with the United Nations’ in 
Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John R.W.D. Jones (eds)The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002) 222. 
54
 Articles 8-23 of the Relationship Agreement. 
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the situation in Darfur, Sudan to the ICC. Additional background information on 
Resolution 1593 (2005) will therefore be provided in order to fully appreciate the 
effect of the SC’s involvement in situations referred to the ICC.  
 
b. Resolution 1593 [2005] 
Resolution 1593 (2005) was issued by the SC on 31 March 2005 at its 5158th 
meeting and based on the report of the International Commission of Inquiry on 
Darfur (Commission),
55
 which was requested by the SC pursuant to Resolution 1564 
(2004).
56
 The SC requested the Secretary-General to establish the Commission in 
order to investigate alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian 
law allegedly committed during the armed conflict in Darfur, Sudan.
57
The 
Commission found that widespread and systematic crimes amounting to crimes 
against humanity, as well as serious violations of international human rights and 
humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes, were committed in Darfur, 
Sudan.
58
 
 
The Commission recommended that the SC refer the situation to the ICC without 
delay as it constituted a threat to international peace and security, a threat repeatedly 
affirmed by the SC.
59 The SC heeded the Commission’s advice and adopted 
Resolution 1593 (2005), which referred the situation in Sudan to the ICC.
60
 The SC 
acknowledged the Commission’s report in the Resolution, which illustrates the level 
of importance afforded to the report.
61
The need to respond swiftly in order to 
maintain and restore international peace and security is also demonstrated by the 
adoption of Resolution 1593 (2005). The Resolution was adopted shortly after the 
submission of the Commission’s report. The Commission submitted its report on 1 
                                                          
55
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593 S/RES/1593 (2005) preamble. 
56
 Ibid para.12. 
57
 Ibid. 
58
 United Nations Security Council Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on violations of 
international humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur S/2005/60 (2005) 3-4. 
59
 Ibid at 5. 
60
 Resolution 1593 S/RES/1593 (2005) para.1. 
61
 Ibid. 
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February 2005 and the SC issued Resolution 1593 on 31
 
March 2005, less than two 
months after the report.
62
  
 
According to the text of Resolution 1593 (2005), it was issued under Chapter VII of 
the Charter of the United Nations.
63
 The SC referred the situation to the Prosecutor of 
the ICC and asserted that Sudan and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur ‘…shall 
cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the 
Prosecutor pursuant to this resolution…’. 64 The SC referral gave the ICC jurisdiction 
over Sudanese nationals, ie nationals from a non-State Party.
65
 Sudan’s referral to the 
ICC and its obligation to ‘…cooperate fully…’ with the ICC and its Prosecutor 
means that it is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court.
66
  
 
This interpretation of the text in Resolution 1593 is also consistent with that of the 
ICC in the issued arrest warrant of 2009. The ICC found that Sudan was bound to the 
Rome Statute by virtue of the SC Resolution.
67
 This meant that the investigation and 
prosecution of the case would be conducted in accordance with its provisions.
68
 Also, 
the binding nature of the referral can be inferred from the language used; the use of 
the word ‘…shall…’ suggests that this is an obligation since it can be interpreted to 
mean mandatory.
69
 The language used in the Resolution shows that the SC made 
Sudan legally bound to the decisions of the ICC. The SC has the competence to make 
such binding decisions on all Members of the UN, including Sudan,
70
 by virtue of the 
use of its Chapter VII powers.
71
  
                                                          
62
 Resolution 1593 S/RES/1593 (2005); United Nations Security Council Report of the International 
Commission of Inquiry on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law in 
Darfur S/2005/60 (2005) 3-4. 
63
 Resolution 1593 S/RES/1593 (2005) preamble - para.1. 
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However, the word ‘…shall…’ is used in relation to Sudan and other parties to the 
conflict in Sudan, suggesting that only these are bound to fully comply with the 
ICC.
72
 The SC simply ‘…urges…’ other states to cooperate with the ICC.73 The use 
of the word ‘…urges…’ shows that it is merely encouraging compliance rather than 
commanding cooperation.
74
 Furthermore, the referral to the Prosecutor instead of the 
ICC itself reflects the SC’s respect for the independence and autonomy of the 
Court.
75
 This is since the Prosecutor of the ICC has the autonomy to investigate 
whether crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ICC have been committed, and 
to determine whether to prosecute or withdraw a referred situation.
 76
  
 
Noteworthy is the fact that Resolution 1593 (2005) did not explicitly refer to Article 
13 (b) of the Rome Statute. This is curious because Article 13 (b) of the RS is, prima 
facie, the legal basis upon which the SC can refer situations to the ICC and the ICC 
can receive such referrals.
77
 There is a possibility that the SC refrained from doing so 
since it can also justify its referral by virtue of the Relationship Agreement between 
the ICC and the UN. This would make explicit reference to Article 13 (b) in the 
Resolution of the RS redundant.  
 
This possibility seems remote, however, as the Relationship Agreement was not 
mentioned either. There might have been a power struggle at play. This is pure 
speculation, but the SC could have avoided expressly mentioning Article 13 (b) of 
the RS as a way of averting being perceived as subject to the provisions of the RS. 
The acknowledgement of Article 13 (b) of the RS as a basis for referring Sudan to 
the ICC would implicitly give the ICC an element of power over the procedure of 
referring a situation.  
 
Resolution 1593 also includes other matters such as financing, an invitation to report 
measures taken in response to the Resolution, and other incidental and miscellaneous 
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matters.
78
 The financing arrangement is questionable, given that no financing was 
stipulated as emanating from the UN.
 79
 One would expect funding from the UN 
since the SC, a UN organ,
 80
 referred the situation to the Court.
81
 Funding for the 
investigation and adjudication of the referred situation is to be drawn from the States 
Parties to the Rome Statute as well as voluntary contributions from third states.
82
 
This suggests that the SC has the autonomy to refer cases to the ICC even without 
providing financial support which could conceivably cripple the Court from 
adjudicating effectively due to lack of funding.  
 
Some scholars have argued that the SC’s decision to withhold UN funding was 
unlawful and raised ‘UN constitutional matters’, as the GA is the organ competent to 
determine the UN budget and decisions related to allocation of UN funds.
83
 The 
GA’s failure to award funds was constitutional. However, it is uncertain whether the 
denial of funding in the Resolution was ‘pre-empt[ive]’ of GA action, or whether it 
was a decision made by the SC outside its competence.
84
 If the latter is true then the 
SC overstepped its competence and acted ultra vires. The SC’s action would be 
inconsistent with Article 17 of the UN Charter and Article 13 of the Relationship 
Agreement. These provisions stipulate that the GA has competence in budgetary 
matters, rather than that of the SC.
85
 In addition to this, the SC would have violated 
the obligation to comply with the UN Charter in the discharge of its duties.
86
  
 
Moreover, its actions would be inconsistent with Article 115 (b) of the RS where the 
ICC stipulates and anticipates receiving funds in respect of referrals from the United 
Nations. The issue of funding, in this instance, illustrates that the relationship 
between the two bodies is not without problems and can lead to issues in the 
functioning of the Court, particularly with regard to the financing of the trials of 
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defendants who might be brought before the Court through the referral mechanism. 
Although this is an important consideration, with the potential for contention and 
conflict, it will not be examined during the research project, which focuses on the 
legality of using Article 13 (b) of the RS to bind third parties to the RS. 
 
c. Conclusion 
The Relationship Agreement between the ICC and the SC shows how these two 
bodies interact with one another as political and judicial bodies working jointly to 
maintain and restore international peace and security. This relationship is possible 
within the international sphere since international law is often interlinked with 
politics.
87
However, even with a regulatory framework such as the Relationship 
Agreement governing their relationship and coordinating their functions, problems 
can arise. This is illustrated in Resolution 1593 where problems such as the question 
of financing, identified above, can surface even in the initial stage of the referral 
procedure. Other concerns which surface in the context of implementation of this 
resolution will be explored in subsequent chapters. The research question and 
structure of the research are outlined below. 
 
1.2 Research Question 
The main question this paper addresses is whether a treaty-body, such as the ICC, 
can use the SC to bind third parties to the Rome Statute. This will be examined by 
exploration of a number of related questions. These include whether the Rome 
Statute can bind third parties through Article 13 (b) of the RS. Other questions relate 
to whether Article 13 (b) of the RS can be used to circumvent CIL, for instance head 
of state immunity, and whether this provision lawfully limits principles in 
international law such as state consent. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement and Methodology 
It is doubtful whether State Parties to the Rome Statute have the competence to use a 
political body such as the SC to compel non-State Parties to be bound to the 
provisions of the Rome Statute. This is especially because treaties such as the Rome 
Statute are subject to negotiation by states before being adopted. It is therefore 
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necessary to investigate whether the States Parties decision to include a provision 
such as Article 13 (b) within the Rome Statute is lawful. Additionally, Article 13 (b) 
of the RS has the potential to violate other rules of CIL such as the doctrine of 
immunity when defendants from third states are brought before the ICC. This is 
because immunity before the ICC is removed by the RS in respect of States Parties 
rather than in respect of individuals from third states.
88
  
 
Article 13 (b) of the RS and its consequential effects on third parties and CIL will be 
analysed using Resolution 1593 (2005) and Al-Bashir’s immunity as an example. 
This will help to establish whether or not the ICC can lawfully rely on or use the SC 
to perform tasks which it is itself unable to carry out. An outline of the law of treaties 
and its application to third parties will be provided. This will be conducted with the 
aim of determining whether Article 13(b) of the RS can be used as a legal basis from 
which to limit the principle of state consent and pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt.
89
 
 
The issue, relating to President Al-Bashir’s immunity, will be used as an example to 
examine whether the ICC through the use of Article 13 (b) of the RS can circumvent 
CIL such as the doctrine of head of state immunity. The limitation of Al-Bashir’s 
immunity is implied by the SC’s referral of the situation in Sudan to the Prosecutor 
of the ICC for investigation and subsequent prosecution if appropriate.
90
 The 
prosecution of Al-Bashir would only be possible if immunity granted to sitting heads 
of state was waived or removed before the ICC. An examination of the doctrine of 
immunity will therefore be undertaken to illustrate under which circumstances it can 
be limited within CIL, by virtue of SC action and before the ICC. This will enable 
further examination of the effect of applying Article 13 (b) of the RS in view of 
establishing its legality, specifically, whether this statutory provision can be used to 
limit CIL, including head of state immunity.   
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CHAPTER 2 THE DOCTRINE OF IMMUNITY  
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter will analyse the doctrine of immunity and how it is traditionally 
removed without SC involvement. The intention is to assess what the position of the 
ICC would be without SC involvement. The doctrine of immunity in CIL will be 
examined including the rationales for immunity. Thereafter the methods of removing 
immunity within CIL and before the ICC will be explored. 
 
2.2 The Position in Customary International Law 
The doctrine of immunity is grounded in, and reflects sovereign equality of states.
91
 
Immunity precludes a state from adjudicating over the legality of another state’s 
actions.
92
 The rationale for according immunity to individuals is to ensure that 
officials are able to carry out international duties that ‘transcend national 
obligations’, and to facilitate the effective functioning of international relations.93 
Immunity is therefore is a right of states;
94
 which is given to its officials as a means 
of enabling them to carry out their duties in order to achieve state objectives 
effectively.
95
 It is provided in international law, CIL and through treaties, as well as 
in national domestic law.
96
  
 
However, this research project will focus on immunity within international law in 
particular, since this is the most relevant to the subject under examination, and the 
SC referral mechanism is grounded within international law. Moreover, the SC’s 
competence is based on the UN Charter, an international treaty, and the referral 
mechanism concerns an international court, the ICC. The doctrine of immunity is 
widely agreed upon as being part of the corpus of CIL.
97
 There are two types of 
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immunity, namely personal immunity and functional immunity.
98
 The former is also 
known as immunity ratione personae and applies to both private and official acts 
since it attaches to the position or status of an individual.
99
 On the other hand, 
functional immunity, also known as immunity ratione materiae, applies to acts 
committed in an official capacity by state officials.
100
  
 
Personal immunity has a wider subject matter application than functional immunity 
since it attaches to both private and official acts, whilst the latter is only applicable to 
official acts. However, according to the Arrest Warrant case, personal immunity 
covers only a limited category of senior officials including incumbent Heads of State, 
Heads of Government, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
101
 This is in contrast to 
functional immunity whose scope of application includes all state officials or agents, 
both high and low ranking.
102
  
 
Immunity ratione personae is the most obviously applicable type of immunity to 
incumbent heads of state such as Al-Bashir since it specifically attaches to such high 
ranking positions.
103
 Immunity ratione materiae, on the other hand, can also be 
applicable to incumbent heads of state in relation to acts committed in their official 
capacity.
104
This is especially since these types of immunities may exist 
simultaneously and overlap.
105
 This means that President Al-Bashir can enjoy both 
functional and personal immunities concurrently.
106
 However, functional and 
personal immunities are grounded under different types of law, namely substantive 
and procedural law respectively.
107
This distinction influences the application of 
immunity before courts as well as how it can be lifted and the consequential effects 
of such removal. 
                                                          
98
 Antonio Cassese ‘When May Senior Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments 
on the Congo v Belgium Case’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International Law 853 at 863. 
99
 Cassese op cit note 98 at 863; Cassese op cit note 14 at 265-6; Akande & Shah op cit note 91 at 
818. 
100
 Cassese op cit note 14 at 265-6. 
101
 Arrest Warrant Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002 para.51. 
 
102
 Cassese op cit note 14 at 266. 
103
 Ibid at 265-6. 
104
 Cassese op cit note 98 at 863. 
105
 Cassese op cit note 14 at 266-7. 
106
 Ibid. 
107
 Ibid at 266. 
22 
 
Functional immunities relate to substantive law and are a substantive defence to 
prosecution.
108
 This as well as their erga omnes nature demonstrates that functional 
immunities can be used to shield officials from prosecution before a court of law if 
their acts are considered to have been carried out in their official capacity.
 109
 This 
protection extends even after officials leave office.
110
However, functional 
immunities can be lifted if they are waived by the issuing state or if international 
crimes are committed.
111
 This will be elaborated in more detail in the next section.  
 
Personal immunities are part of procedural law and pose a procedural bar to the 
jurisdiction of courts.
112
 This means that a court’s civil or criminal jurisdiction is 
simply delayed, during the period when immunities are applicable, without resulting 
in exoneration or impunity.
113
 This also shows that individuals who possess personal 
immunity are shielded from criminal or civil jurisdiction rather than criminal 
responsibility.
114
 Foreign domestic courts and international criminal courts such as 
the ICC can therefore prosecute as soon as the jurisdictional bar is removed, waived 
or lost.  
 
The above analysis briefly touched on the removal of immunity which ceases in 
different respects depending on the type of immunity, whether functional or 
personal.
115
 The lifting of immunity also depends on whether the accused is before a 
foreign domestic court or an international court; this will be analysed in greater detail 
below. 
 
2.3  The Removal of Immunity  
The removal of immunity and its associated consequences differ depending on the 
forum. The accused may be standing before an international criminal court such as 
the ICC, or before foreign domestic courts applying CIL, or be in a situation where 
the removal of immunity is sanctioned through an SC resolution (analysed in Chapter 
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Three). In this chapter, the position before the ICC and foreign domestic courts will 
be analysed to give a background to, and complete picture of, the circumstances 
surrounding the removal or waiver of immunity. This will lead to a clearer 
delineation of the SC’s power, when the effect of SC resolutions on immunity is 
distinguished from the position in CIL and international criminal courts. This will 
also lead to greater insight into how the SC’s influence on the ICC changes the 
immunity of accused persons before the court. 
 
a. Position before foreign domestic courts 
i. Personal immunities 
Personal immunities, as analysed above, apply to both official and private acts whilst 
the relevant official is in office.
116
 This means that foreign domestic courts cannot lift 
immunity and prosecute officials whilst they are still in office, as they are bound to 
observe CIL which is binding on all states.
 117
 The binding nature of CIL on states is 
confirmed in the ICJ case known as Continental Shelf.
118
 Sitting heads of state such 
as Al-Bashir are therefore exempt from prosecution by foreign domestic courts 
during their term in office. This inviolability has been confirmed in various cases 
such as those involving heads of state such as Fidel Castro and Mugabe.
119
 
 
However, personal immunities cease after an individual leaves office, at which time 
they may be prosecuted for acts committed during their time in office, even by 
foreign domestic courts.
120
 This is logical since personal immunities attach to the 
position or status of an individual and should therefore be lifted once an individual 
vacates the position and loses the status to which his or her immunities apply.
 121
 
President Al-Bashir can therefore be prosecuted in foreign domestic courts after he 
leaves office, for the crimes committed during his time in office. The situation differs 
in respect of functional immunity which attaches to acts committed in official 
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capacity by state officials.
122
 The lifting of functional immunity and how it differs 
from personal immunity will be examined below. 
 
ii. Functional immunity 
Functional immunity remains applicable even after an official leaves office, since the 
immunity attaches to official acts rather than the position as with personal 
immunities.
123
As a result, officials accorded functional immunity cannot be 
prosecuted for official acts committed whilst in office once they leave office.
 124 
However, unlawful acts committed in official capacity can be attributed to the state 
and lead to civil liability.
125
 There is an exception to the application of functional 
immunity in respect of international crimes. The Nuremberg judgment found that the 
doctrine of immunity cannot be applied to acts that are regarded as criminal in 
international law.
126
The Court reasoned that international crimes could not be 
considered as state acts, and that immunity therefore could not shield individuals 
from criminal responsibility and accountability.
127
 
 
 
The Court’s reasoning in the Nuremberg judgment demonstrates that functional 
immunity can be removed if the most serious crimes that shock the world are 
committed.
128
 This is confirmed in various domestic cases. These include well-
known cases such as Nuremberg, Pinochet, Eichman and domestic cases from courts 
such as France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, 
Poland, Spain and Mexico.
129
 These courts clarified the removal of functional 
immunity at the domestic level.
130
 Scholars such as Cassese also reason that the 
removal of functional immunity with respect to international crimes is part of the 
corpus of CIL.
131
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Cassese makes a persuasive case by identifying and outlining various state practice 
and opinio juris, emanating from the case law of international and domestic courts.
132 
The evidence presented by Cassese includes the aforementioned case law, as well as 
others from various courts, which interpret and clarify international law.
133
 These 
courts reason that functional immunity is removed when an individual is accused of 
committing international crimes.
134
 The scholarly interpretation therefore shows the 
CIL position whilst case law clarifies functional immunity within international law 
via judicial interpretation. The consistency between the scholastic position and 
judicial interpretation of functional immunity is persuasive and highlights how an 
exception to the application of functional immunity indeed exists. However, other 
scholars such as Akande and Shah diverge from the reasoning of the aforementioned 
Courts and that of Cassese, finding unconvincing the argument that international 
crimes cannot be considered as state acts.
135
 
 
 
Akande and Shah criticise the finding by raising several counterarguments. They 
assert that the removal of functional immunity is based on the presumed illegality of 
an act.
 136
 This infringes upon presumption of innocence since allegations will not yet 
have been confirmed when immunity is removed.
137
 However, Akande and Shah’s 
argument is not convincing because functional immunity is a substantive defence to 
prosecution.
138
 Its removal simply hinders use of the automatic defence of functional 
immunity; one of the defences a defendant can use to avoid criminal responsibility in 
court.
139
 This removal therefore cannot be considered as presumed guilt.  
 
Akande and Shah also assert that the sovereignty of an act does not depend on its 
legality but rather on whether it is ‘governmental’.140 They raise a valid point but fail 
to recognise that the removal of functional immunity in respect of international 
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crimes has become part of CIL.
141
 This entry into the corpus of CIL makes the 
removal legally binding on all states and their officials regardless of whether a state 
agrees with the relevant rule or not.
142
 The CIL position also shows wide acceptance 
by states who appear to be more inclined to end impunity or to individually prosecute 
international crimes as a means of deterrence, rather than strictly adhering to the 
principle of sovereignty. Given the foregoing, Akande and Shah’s argument is 
unpersuasive and will not be utilised here, other than to illustrate the diverging views 
around the subject. 
 
The judicial and scholastic position in support of the lifting of functional immunity 
for international crimes also illustrates that individuals are liable for committing 
international crimes even if these were sanctioned by the state.
143
 This is since acts of 
criminality, widely recognized as such, will not be tolerated if these are perpetrated 
in the international community, even if carried out by individuals acting on behalf of 
states.
144
 As a result, functional immunity cannot be used to shield criminal 
responsibility and accountability in respect of international crimes.  
 
The removal of functional immunity in relation to international crimes is rational 
since certain international crimes are also prohibited as jus cogens (peremptory 
norms). These international crimes, although disputed, include aggression, piracy, 
slavery, torture as well as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
145
 As a 
result, states and their officials have a duty to comply with jus cogens since these are 
international principles that are universally recognized and accepted by states in the 
international community, and from which no derogation is possible.
146
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Another justification is that peremptory norms supersede other obligations since they 
are hierarchically superior to general international law including CIL and the rights 
arising therein such as functional immunity.
147
 This means that jus cogens trump 
functional immunity granted in CIL.
148
As a result, individuals who violate jus 
cogens, by perpetrating international crimes that are prohibited under jus cogens, are 
criminally responsible and liable regardless of whether or not their actions have been 
authorized by their state.
149
 This viewpoint is consistent with the normative hierarchy 
theory where jus cogens supersede functional immunity.
150 
In appropriate cases the 
violation of international crimes could entail both individual criminal responsibility 
as well as state responsibility.
151
  
 
iii. Consequences of removing immunity  
As has been argued in section 2.2 of this chapter, President Al-Bashir can enjoy both 
functional and personal immunities concurrently since these exist simultaneously and 
overlap.
152
This means that the removal or lifting of immunity, functional and 
personal, will have different implications before foreign domestic courts. The crimes 
of which President Al-Bashir is accused include genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.
153  
These crimes are recognized as international crimes and 
prohibited as part of jus cogens.
154
 Case law from international and domestic courts 
also verifies that serious international crimes such as piracy, slavery, genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture are part of CIL.
155
 This is because 
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such crimes are widely agreed upon as criminal in the international community 
reflecting opinio juris and state practice. 
 
Judicial practice also demonstrates that these international crimes are subject to the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction, by any state, without the need of a causal link 
between the state and the crime.
156
 According to the Eichmann case ‘…crimes which 
offended the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are grave 
offences against the law of nations itself ("delicta juris gentium").’157 This is also 
confirmed in the Reservations to the Convention on Genocide case since crimes that 
‘…shock the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to humanity…’ are 
subject to universal jurisdiction by any state.
158
  
 
As aforementioned, President Al-Bashir is accused of having committed 
international crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
159
 
Functional immunity is lifted in respect of these crimes given the CIL position, and 
the normative hierarchy theory stipulating the status of these crimes as jus cogens 
trumps functional immunity.
160
 The functional immunity of President Al-Bashir is 
removed making him, prima facie, subject to universal jurisdiction exercised by any 
foreign domestic courts. However, Al-Bashir is also entitled to personal immunity 
which shields him from prosecution during his term in office.
161
Although one form 
of immunity, functional, is removed the other applicable personal immunity would 
also need to be removed before he could prosecuted by a domestic court.
162
 President 
Al-Bashir is therefore covered by personal immunity and can only be prosecuted 
before foreign domestic courts after he leaves office.
163
 
 
The examination of the doctrine of immunity before foreign domestic courts, showed 
the removal of functional and personal immunity within CIL and the associated 
consequences. The position of immunity before foreign domestic courts, in relation 
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to applicability and removal, largely reflects the position of immunity within CIL. 
The reason for this is that these courts are bound to respect and comply with 
principles of CIL, and at times have jurisdiction over a case by virtue of universal 
jurisdiction grounded in CIL. However, Resolution 1593 referred the situation in 
Sudan to the ICC rather than foreign domestic courts. The approach in this Court is 
more relevant to the subject under discussion ie the use of the SC to subject third 
parties to the ICC’s jurisdiction. 
 
The ICC does not presently have President Al-Bashir in custody but it is necessary to 
analyse how immunity is normally abrogated before this Court.
164
 This analysis will 
also help to illustrate the obligations placed on states to arrest and surrender 
President Al-Bashir. The lifting of immunity before the ICC will be examined below. 
 
b. Position before the ICC 
The Rome Statute recognizes one legal regime of immunity for States Parties and 
one for non-States Parties. This is illustrated by provisions of the RS, particularly 
Articles 27 and 98, which regulate immunity for State Parties and non-State Parties 
respectively.
165
According to scholars, such as Burchard, Article 27 (1) of the RS 
expressly lifts functional immunity whilst Article 27 (2) of the RS removes personal 
immunities.
166
 In addition, the language used in these provisions can be interpreted to 
support the views expressed within academia.  
 
Article 27 (1) of the RS refers to the granting of immunity based on ‘official 
capacity’ which suggests that immunity is attached to individuals serving in their 
public capacity.
167
 The provision also lists examples of positions in which 
individuals can serve an official capacity, which includes ‘…Heads of State or 
Government or, member of a Government or parliament, an elected 
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representative…’.168 Article 27 (2) of the RS refers to the ‘official capacity of a 
person’ which suggests that immunities would be attached to the official status of a 
person.
169
 This can be inferred from the fact that the provision explicitly links official 
capacity to a person, which suggests that official capacity emanates from the status 
or specific position occupied by an individual, unlike Article 27 (1) which only refers 
to official capacity generally. However, reference to both official capacity and a 
person also implies that both functional and personal immunities may be applicable. 
The applicability of both types of immunity is endorsed by scholars such as 
Burchard.
170
  
 
Gaeta argues that Article 27(1) of the Rome Statute is in accordance with CIL since 
functional immunities are lifted in respect of international crimes.
171
 However, 
Article 27 (2), which is applicable to personal immunity, departs from CIL since 
immunity for State Parties is relinquished when an accused is brought before the 
Court.
172
 This derogates from the position in CIL where personal immunities are 
absolute during the relevant official’s period in office.173 Article 27 of the RS can 
generally be construed as a waiver of immunity for States Parties to the Rome Statute 
since the statutory instrument to which they are legally bound includes a provision 
that removes immunity.
174
  
 
The distinction between the position in CIL and that within international criminal 
courts such as the ICC is evident. Even sitting heads of state accorded immunity 
ratione personae can be prosecuted by the ICC.
175
 On the other hand, there is the 
CIL position, where immunity allows for prosecutions only after one leaves office.
176
  
However, the ICC position should not be regarded as a complete departure from CIL. 
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The RS recognises immunities, in Article 27 of the RS, that are granted to high level 
officials including sitting heads of state but these are simply waived before the ICC, 
for States Parties.
177
  
 
It appears that immunity is more easily lifted in respect of the ICC, which utilises a 
statutory provision necessitating the waiver of immunity before the Court. The ICC 
therefore has an easier method of dealing with immunity from jurisdiction than 
foreign domestic courts. It is difficult for foreign domestic courts to remove or lift 
immunity, and this is compounded by the CIL position which grants absolute 
personal immunity while the relevant official is in office.
178
 This can be contrasted 
with the ICC that uses Article 27 of the RS to remove immunity.
179
 
 
State Parties, by ratifying the RS, have expressly agreed to be bound to this statutory 
instrument.
180
 They have waived their immunity which is expressed through Article 
27 of the RS.
 181
 This differs from foreign domestic courts who usually do not have 
the consent of the individuals being indicted before their court, and are therefore 
bound to respect the doctrine of immunity grounded in CIL. However, Article 27 (2) 
is prima facie inapplicable to Al-Bashir since Sudan is not a State Party to the ICC.  
 
Article 98 (1) of the RS which applies to non-States Parties is prima facie the most 
applicable provision to the Al-Bashir case. This is because Sudan is a non-State Party 
to the Rome Statute and therefore a third party which, in principle, should not be 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC without its express consent.
 182
 Article 98 (1) of 
the RS obligates the ICC to refrain from issuing requests for arrest and surrender in 
cases dealing with third states that have not ratified the Rome Statute. According to 
this provision the ICC cannot issue requests for arrest and surrender that are 
inconsistent with duties of states under international law unless the third state 
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consents to the ICC’s jurisdiction or waives its immunity. This is rational since 
immunity is protected within customary international law.
183
  
 
Article 98 (1) of the RS therefore seems to imply that the decisions of the ICC cannot 
supersede customary international law. A reading of Article 27(2) of the RS validates 
this inference since an interpretation of the language in the text suggests that it is 
merely a waiver of immunity and that the provision does not in and of itself lift or 
remove immunity.
184
According to Article 98 of the RS, the immunities of third 
parties can be removed only if waived. The ICC would thus not be able to remove 
the immunity of President Al-Bashir without the involvement of the SC. The ICC 
would be prevented from even issuing an arrest warrant if immunity against 
President Al-Bashir was not waived or removed.
185
 
 
If immunity is not removed, States Parties would also be hindered from arresting and 
surrendering President Al-Bashir before the ICC.
186
This would render the 
adjudication of a case impossible as trials in absentia are prohibited at the ICC.
187
 
The removal of immunity is therefore crucial to the prosecution of individuals from 
non-State Parties. If the SC is competent to limit immunity, its contribution will be 
indispensable to the functioning of the ICC in matters relating to third parties.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
The exploration of the doctrine of immunity in CIL demonstrated that President Al-
Bashir is covered by both functional and personal immunity.
188
However, the 
functional immunity of President Al-Bashir is removed in respect of the international 
crimes of which he is accused.
 189
 However, foreign domestic courts are unable to 
prosecute him since his personal immunity survives until after he leaves office.
 190
 
The relationship between functional and personal immunity within CIL was also 
demonstrated and contrasted with the position within the ICC.  
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The ICC respects the CIL position in the context of Article 27 (1) of the RS but this 
is not the case for Article 27 (2) of the RS on personal immunities.
191
 Article 27 (2) 
of the RS lifts personal immunity even during an official’s term in office, which is 
inconsistent with the CIL position.
192
 Examination into the position at the ICC also 
showed that immunity is regulated differently depending on the status of the state ie 
whether it is a State Party or non-State Party.
193
 This is rational since it is a treaty-
based institution which should comply with the law of treaties, binding only states 
that have expressly agreed to be bound.
194
 
 
The analysis in this chapter also revealed the probable necessity of SC involvement 
in cases involving non-State Parties, which would otherwise be impossible to 
adjudicate. This is implied by Article 98 (1) of the RS which stipulates that the ICC 
is not able to even issue an arrest warrant if the relevant third party has not waived its 
immunity. The inability of the ICC to issue a warrant for the arrest and surrender of 
defendants before the Court would render the adjudication of a case impossible as 
trials in absentia are prohibited.
195
 The SC’s powers will be examined in Chapter 
Three to determine whether it is able to remove immunity protected within CIL. 
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CHAPTER 3 SECURITY COUNCIL REFERRAL AS A TRIGGER OF ICC       
  JURISDICTION 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will examine the SC referral mechanism to the ICC. The legal basis of 
this referral mechanism and the problems that arise from conferring jurisdiction in 
this manner will be outlined. The issues raised by compelling third parties to be 
subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction will be narrowed to those relating to Resolution 
1593 (2005). As stated, these include the lack of state consent to the ICC’s 
jurisdiction and the removal of Al-Bashir’s immunity. This chapter will examine the 
effect of SC resolutions on the principle of state consent and head of state immunity, 
with a view to establishing whether these can be limited by the SC in order to enable 
effective prosecution by the ICC.  
 
3.2 The Legal Basis of the Security Council Referral Mechanism 
The referral of situations to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for 
investigation by the SC is a method of triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction over a case or 
situation.
196
 According to Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute, the statutory and 
governing instrument of the ICC, the powers of the SC to refer cases to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC for investigation are enshrined within its Chapter VII powers. 
However, it is not the only method of triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction which may 
also be set off through a referral to the Prosecutor by States Parties,
197
 a proprio motu 
investigation by the Prosecutor,
198
 and referrals by states that accept the jurisdiction 
of the ICC on an ad hoc basis ie in respect of a particular crime.
199
  
 
The SC referral mechanism is an exceptional procedure of triggering the ICC’s 
jurisdiction, in which a political body is utilised to facilitate jurisdiction to the ICC. It 
is the only method of triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction that involves a third party to 
the Court such as the SC. The other procedures of setting off the Courts jurisdiction, 
described above, involve either the Prosecutor of the ICC, States Parties to the ICC 
or states that have voluntarily accepted the jurisdiction of the ICC.
200
 These are all 
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bound to the ICC and are part of the ICC through legal means such as ratification, ad 
hoc acceptance of jurisdiction, or the need to carry out their mandate as in the case of 
the Prosecutor.
201
 However, the SC is independent of the ICC as it is not bound to the 
RS’s provisions; according to the Relationship Agreement, the SC is bound to the 
UN Charter.
202
 However, the SC does appear to be subject to the RS in certain ways, 
for instance, Article 13 (b) of the RS makes it clear that the SC needs to issue the 
referral according to its Chapter VII powers. 
 
The SC in Resolution 1593 explicitly mentioned that it referred the situation in 
Sudan in accordance with its Chapter VII powers.
203
 This could be interpreted as 
merely affirming the legal basis upon which the referral mechanism is grounded 
within the UN Charter, which is the SC’s governing statutory instrument.204 The SC 
derives its power from the UN Charter rather than the RS.
205
 The inclusion of 
Chapter VII powers within the RS is therefore merely a confirmation of this legal 
basis rather than an instruction or assigned duty for the SC to issue decisions in a 
certain manner. This is obvious since the SC as aforementioned is not bound to the 
RS but is only subject to the provisions of the UN Charter.
206
 
 
Article 13 (b) of the RS demonstrates the importance of the SC’s Chapter VII 
powers. This warrants closer scrutiny of the scope and limitations to the exercise of 
this power. It is important to understand the legal basis of the referral mechanism and 
the power that the ICC derives from the use of Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute, 
which is the basis for the utilisation of the SC’s power. The SC’s Chapter VII powers 
will be examined in greater detail in the following section. 
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3.3 The Security Council’s Chapter VII powers 
The Security Council is mandated to maintain international peace and security and 
has wide-ranging powers to fulfil its mandate;
207
 these are enshrined within Chapters 
VI, VII, VIII, and XI of the UN Charter.
208
 Chapter VII enshrines the most extensive 
of the SC’s powers.209 These powers are also the treaty basis upon which referrals to 
the ICC are effected.
210
 According to Article 13 (b) of the RS, the involvement of the 
Security Council in the ICC is by virtue of the exercise of its Chapter VII powers. 
This provision reflects reality as exemplified by the language in Resolution 1593, 
which makes specific reference to Chapter VII and the maintenance of international 
peace and security.
211
 The Security Council is obligated to qualify situations and 
events in accordance with Article 39 of the UN Charter.
212
 This is owing to the fact 
that the exercise of its Chapter VII powers is set off by the qualification of events 
and situations as ‘…threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression…’.213 
 
The Security Council has wide discretion to determine whether situations fulfil the 
criteria in Article 39 of the UN Charter, and whether enforcement action is to be 
adopted to respond to such situations.
214
 The SC can adopt enforcement measures 
enshrined within Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Charter after situations are qualified 
within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter.
 215
Article 40 of the UN Charter 
regulates provisional measures, while Article 41 is concerned with enforcement 
measures not involving the use of force.
216
 Article 42 of the UN Charter sanctions the 
use of force: ‘…by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
international peace and security….’.217  
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The use of force by the SC in the exercise of its Chapter VII powers is therefore an 
exception to the prohibition within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
218
 The SC’s 
ability to use force during enforcement measures is striking and illustrates its 
extensive power since it is able to limit principles that are part of CIL such as 
‘…non-use of force…’.219 Decisions made within the scope of the SC’s Chapter VII 
powers are adopted with the aim to ‘…maintain and restore international peace and 
security….’ a function over which it has primary responsibility.220 These decisions 
are binding on Member States of the UN according to Articles 25 and 48 of the UN 
Charter.
221
 Case law of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) such as Lockerbie has 
also affirmed the binding nature of the SC’s Chapter VII decisions.222 This case and 
other cases within the ICJ’s jurisprudence are authoritative since they are 
clarifications of international law by the main judicial organ of the UN, which is 
competent to issue advisory opinions on legal matters.
223
 
 
The binding nature of Chapter VII decisions means that the Member States of the 
UN are legally bound to comply with the decisions of the Security Council.
224
 Sudan, 
a Member State of the UN, is bound by the decision, in Resolution 1593, to refer it to 
the Prosecutor of the ICC for investigation and subsequent prosecution if 
appropriate.
225
 The SC’s Chapter VII decisions are also consistent with the principle 
of state consent, an important principle in international law.
226
 States are deemed to 
have given consent to be bound via Article 25 of the UN Charter.
227
 Additionally, 
these decisions supersede other obligations arising from other treaties.
228
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However, the Security Council’s competence to adopt and issue decisions under its 
Chapter VII powers is not unrestricted. This is confirmed by the ICTY in the Tadic 
case where the court pronounced on the possibility of limiting the SC’s enforcement 
action within its Chapter VII powers.
229
The Tadic case refers to possible 
‘…constitutional…’ limitations on the SC’s powers, enshrined within Article 24 (2) 
of the UN Charter.
 230
 As with the case of the jurisprudence of the ICJ, that of other 
international criminal courts is also authoritative since it clarifies international law.  
 
Article 24 (2) of the UN Charter obligates the SC to act in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the UN. The SC is also bound to comply with jus cogens 
since these are peremptory norms from which no derogation is possible.
231
 Scholars 
such as de Wet have identified limitations to the SC’s power which emanate from 
Article 24 (2) of the UN Charter.
232
 The obligation to comply with the purposes and 
principles of the UN, in Article 24 (2) of the RS, is required in the SC’s exercise of 
its powers, including those within its Chapter VII powers. This would include 
decisions and enforcement measures adopted under its Chapter VII powers such as 
referring a situation to the ICC.
233
 This can be inferred from Article 24 (2) of the UN 
Charter, which stipulates that the Security Council is to act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the UN in the discharge of its mandate, the maintenance 
of international peace and security.
234
 This duty would therefore include all action 
adopted in executing its mandate. 
 
An ICJ advisory opinion also confirmed the limitations to the SC’s power arising 
from the UN Charter, where the Court found that: ‘The political character of an 
organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by 
the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its 
judgment….’.235 This ICJ finding, that of the ICTY, as well as the content of Article 
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24 of the UN Charter demonstrates that the SC’s competence under Chapter VII is 
limited in certain respects.
 236
 However, the purposes and principles of the UN are 
phrased in broad and generic language which limits legal certainty regarding the 
scope of the limitations and whether there is an established hierarchy in the relevant 
norms.
237
  
 
The purposes of the UN which are relevant to the SC include compliance with 
principles of justice and international law, respect for human rights and self-
determination.
238 
As well as striving to achieve international cooperation in resolving 
international disputes, and harmonisation of action undertaken in respect of 
collective action adopted to ensure the maintenance of international peace and 
security.
239 
The
 
principles to be respected include the recognition of the sovereign 
equality of all Member States, acting in good faith, not dealing with matters within 
the domestic jurisdiction of Members, unless necessary for the exercise of Chapter 
VII powers, and ensuring non-Members’ compliance with the principles of the UN in 
the maintenance of peace and security.
240
 
 
Given the foregoing, it is questionable whether the SC has the competence to 
supersede, Al-Bashir’s, immunity and the principle of state consent grounded in the 
sovereign equality of states.
241
 This is especially since the SC has an obligation to act 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN, including compliance with 
the principles of justice and international law, as well as respecting the principle of 
sovereign equality of Member States.
242
 The SC also has an obligation to act in 
accordance with CIL, such as respecting the immunity of sitting heads of state.
 243
 
This can be inferred from the obligation to comply with principles of justice and 
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international law.
244
 This view is supported by scholars such as Akande who suggest 
that the SC has a duty to comply with general international law, including CIL.
245
   
 
However, the abrogation of immunity by the SC is imperative for the prosecution of 
President Al-Bashir, since as a sitting head of state he is accorded immunity from 
jurisdiction which is protected within CIL.
246
 The limitation of the principle of state 
consent is also important since, according to the law of treaties, a third party such as 
Sudan cannot be bound to a treaty such as the Rome Statute without its consent.
247
 
The effect of SC referrals on immunity as well as its competence to limit the 
principle of state consent will be examined in the following section.  
 
3.4 The Security Council’s Competence to limit international law 
a. State consent 
State consent, as aforementioned, is grounded in the principle of sovereign equality 
which is a principle of the UN.
248 
It is also a cornerstone of the principle of autonomy 
and sovereignty which empowers a state to determine the rights and obligations by 
which it will be legally bound.
 249
 A state is thus only bound to a treaty if it expresses 
consent to be bound.
 250
 The decision to be bound should, in principle, be determined 
solely by the relevant state.
251
  
 
However, this is not always the case. Chapter 1, section1.1, illustrated that the SC 
referral mechanism to the ICC binds third parties to the RS, in doing so it violates 
state consent.
252
 Denying non-State Parties the right to express willingness to be 
bound to a treaty, such as the RS, and treaty-based institutions is a violation of the 
principle of sovereignty. This is especially given that a state has the right to make 
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decisions that affect it, including whether or not to be subjected to the jurisdiction of 
a treaty-based institution.
253
 
 
The SC as analysed above has a duty to comply with the purposes and principles of 
the UN including sovereignty, a principle of the UN.
254
 However, certain purposes 
and principles of the UN are not absolute and can be limited where objectively 
justified. The SC is permitted to infringe the principle obligating 
‘…[non]interference in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State…’ if 
this is necessary in carrying out its enforcement action under Chapter VII.
255
 In other 
words, the SC is obligated to respect matters that are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of a state to the extent that doing so does not prejudice the exercise of its 
Chapter VII powers.
256
  
 
State consent, as aforementioned, is grounded in sovereign equality but can be 
limited through Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter.
257
 This is because the principle of 
sovereignty is intertwined with the concept of domestic jurisdiction which can be 
limited through Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter.
258
 Given the foregoing, Resolution 
1593 (2005) which was issued under the SC’s Chapter VII powers can restrict the 
principle of state consent.
259
 This is endorsed by scholars such as Berman who argue 
that SC referrals to the ICC override state consent, which is ordinarily a prerequisite 
for the ICC to have jurisdiction.
260
 The SC therefore has a treaty basis for limiting 
principles such as state consent and sovereignty.
261
 Scholars such as de Wet also 
agree with the possibility of limiting state sovereignty but argue that an exception 
exists in the case of the core elements of this concept, such as the territorial integrity 
of a state.
262
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The limitation of sovereignty and associated principles such as state consent is 
rational since sovereignty is no longer absolute.
263
 This is evidenced by the effect of 
jus cogens and CIL which are binding on states regardless of whether states have 
expressed consent to be bound.
264
 CIL is binding since universal acceptance is not 
necessary for a rule to enter the corpus of CIL.
265
 States are not permitted to derogate 
from jus cogens norms, whether they express consent to be bound is 
inconsequential.
266
   
 
Sovereignty and state consent can also be limited in cases where the international 
community pursues common objectives such as international peace and security. 
This is demonstrated, for instance, when Article 25 and Article 2 (7) of the UN 
Charter are read together. Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter provides an exception to 
widely recognised international principles such as sovereignty, whilst Article 25 is an 
expression of consent by Members States to be bound to the decisions of the SC. The 
SC’s decisions, within its powers,267 would include those adopted in the pursuit of 
international peace and security provided within its Chapter VII powers. The 
autonomy given to the SC to limit sovereignty, and state acceptance to be bound to 
its decisions, highlights the fact that sovereignty can be limited in the pursuit of more 
pressing priorities. 
 
Furthermore, the SC’s practice of qualifying internal situations as threats within the 
meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter, also demonstrates the changing perceptions 
towards the principle of sovereignty. The SC intervenes and characterises internal 
situations, with or without international ramifications, within the meaning of Article 
39 of the UN Charter.
268
 This illustrates the erosion of sovereignty since internal 
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matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states can be subject to international 
scrutiny, and intervention by bodies such as the SC. The overall objective of 
maintaining international peace and security trumps sovereignty.  
 
It has been demonstrated that the Security Council is competent to limit sovereignty 
and state consent when referring a situation to the Prosecutor of the ICC for 
investigation. Sudan’s sovereignty and state consent as a third party to the RS would 
therefore be limited in respect of cases referred to the Court, including that of 
President Al-Bashir. The removal of immunity through SC resolutions will now be 
examined below. 
 
b. Immunity 
Immunity, as with state consent, is grounded in the principle of sovereign equality of 
states,
269 
and protected within the CIL.
270
 Sovereignty, as illustrated in relation to the 
principle of state consent, can be limited by virtue of Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter. 
Immunity which is grounded in sovereignty, particularly sovereign equality,
271
 can 
therefore be limited.
272
 The SC would prima facie be able to limit sovereignty. 
However, immunity is protected within CIL, and the SC’s competence to limit CIL is 
questionable. This is because the SC has a duty to comply with CIL, which can be 
deduced from its obligation to comply with the principles of justice and international 
law.
273
 Also, although Article 103 of the UN Charter refers to the SC’s competence 
to override treaties, it is not obvious whether this also applies to CIL. Scholars such 
as Kiyani argue that though the SC has the competence to supersede international 
treaties, it cannot limit CIL.
274
 
 
The SC’s competence to lift immunity grounded in CIL is a contentious subject 
which has led to varying opinions being voiced. The main opinions will be examined 
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in three distinct subsections. These subsections will outline the effect of SC 
resolutions on immunity at both the vertical and horizontal levels. The former relates 
to the relationship between the SC and the ICC, while the latter deals with interstate 
relations.
275
 The examination at different levels will be explored to uncover the 
possible ramifications of Resolution 1593 (2005), which are not entirely obvious.  
 
i. The interpretation adopted by the ICC 
The Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC (PTC), in the arrest warrant decision of 2009, held 
that the investigation and prosecution of the Al-Bashir case would be conducted in 
accordance with the RS. 
276
 This was one of the grounds used to justify a finding that 
the ICC had jurisdiction over the case.
277
 The ICC only explicitly addressed the 
removal of Al-Bashir’s immunity, two years later, in its decision on the non-
cooperation of Malawi and Chad with the arrest warrant issued against President Al-
Bashir.
278
 In the Malawi decision, the ICC found that CIL provided an exception to 
head of state immunity before international courts, meaning that immunity was 
removed before such courts.
279
 In the Chad decision, the ICC simply reiterated its 
reasoning in the Malawi case.
280
 The ICC cited case law of other international courts 
including the Nuremberg tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal, the ICTR and ICTY to 
demonstrate the CIL position.
281
 The Court also found in the Malawi and Chad cases 
that these States had an obligation to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir to the 
ICC since his immunity was removed.
282
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Gaeta supports the ICC’s finding that immunity is removed before international 
courts.
 283
 She considers this rule to be part of CIL, using similar justifications to that 
of the ICC, by citing practice before the ICTY, ICTR, Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(SCSL) and ICJ.
284
 However, she criticises the initial finding made during the arrest 
warrant judgement where the Court ruled that the RS would be applicable to 
Sudan.
285According to Gaeta, the SC is only a trigger of the ICC’s jurisdiction which 
cannot confer Sudan the status of a State Party, an effect of applying the RS to 
Sudan.
286
 Provisions of the RS such as Article 27 of the RS, removing immunity for 
State Parties,
 287
 would therefore be inapplicable.
 288
 
 
Gaeta also disagrees with the ICC’s reasoning stipulating the removal of immunity 
between states, which would enable Malawi and Chad to arrest and surrender 
President Al-Bashir.
 289
 She argues instead that the removal of immunity by the ICC 
would only apply at the vertical level, before the Court and Sudan, and not between 
or amongst states.
290
 States such as South Africa would therefore be obligated to 
respect the immunity of a sitting head of state such as President Al-Bashir. South 
Africa and other States Parties to the RS would also be barred from arresting and 
surrendering President Al-Bashir, since his immunity would still exist between states 
ie at the horizontal level.
291
 Gaeta’s views, as well as the ICC’s finding in the Malawi 
and Chad decisions on non-cooperation illustrate the various views and 
interpretations adopted on this subject. 
 
The finding that CIL contains a rule where immunity is removed before international 
courts is unpersuasive. It has been criticized by academics such as Akande who 
consider this finding to be essentially flawed.
292
 This is especially because neither the 
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ICC nor Gaeta identifies or outlines state practice from States Parties to the RS.
293 
Also, the enunciated CIL exception removes the relevance of Article 98 of the RS, 
on respecting the immunities of third states, if immunity is removed before an 
international court.
294
 This would also violate the principle of effectiveness where 
provisions should be interpreted in a manner that will give effectiveness and 
‘…meaning…’.295 The ICC also failed to acknowledge that the international courts it 
referenced applied their statutory instruments, which were binding on the relevant 
individuals for various reasons, and removed immunity.
296
 The Court’s reasoning 
was thus flawed for various reasons. 
 
The ICC’s wrongful reasoning also extends to the obligations placed on Malawi and 
Chad to arrest and surrender President Al-Bashir. The ICC did not justify the 
removal of immunity at this level or acknowledge that immunity at different levels, 
horizontal and vertical, would vary.
 297
 This shows that the Court’s reasoning was not 
well-thought out and rationalised. This is more obvious in view of Gaeta’s opinion 
that immunity at the horizontal level was not eradicated which was justified and 
more convincing than the ICC’s ruling. 298 However, it is unclear whether the view of 
Gaeta relating to the obligations placed on states is correct. This is especially in view 
of the fact that it is based on the CIL argument which has been identified as 
incorrect. 
 
However, the ICC’s position is inconsistent, especially in view of the reasoning used 
to justify the removal of immunity in the decision on the non-cooperation of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
299
 This case was decided three years after 
that of the Malawi and Chad cases and was based on different rationales. It departed 
from the reasoning in the Chad and Malawi cases without even mentioning the 
rationales adopted in the previous cases. In the DRC case, the Court found that heads 
of state were granted immunity in international law but this was removed before the 
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ICC through Article 27 (2) of the RS, which was applicable only in respect of States 
Parties, not third parties such as Sudan.
300
  
 
The Court, in the DRC case, reasoned that the immunity of President Al-Bashir was 
removed as it was deemed a State Party by virtue of Resolution 1593 referring it to 
the Court.
301
 It interpreted the language in the Resolution which obligates Sudan’s 
full cooperation with the Court, as implicitly removing immunity.
302
 It is 
questionable whether such a wide interpretation and broadening of the Resolution’s 
language is correct. The overall position of the ICC is unsettled. This discrepancy is 
compounded by the lack of a doctrine of binding precedent and a hierarchy in the 
ICC’s Chambers.303 This limits legal certainty and predictability regarding how the 
removal of immunity is interpreted by the ICC.  
 
ii. The need for explicit and clear language   
Scholars such as Wardle argue that the SC needs to explicitly specify derogations or 
huge departures from international law such as the limitation of immunity, which is 
protected within CIL.
304
 He further asserts that the SC needed to use explicit 
language in order to lift Al-Bashir’s head of state immunity.305 The Al-Jedda case of 
the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) also supports the need for explicit and 
plain language in SC Resolutions.
306
 The EctHR in Al-jedda made this finding in 
response to the United Kingdom’s claim that the SC had implicitly authorised 
violations of human rights.
307
 This was allegedly implied through a SC Resolution 
that called for the adoption of ‘…all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of security and stability…’. 308  
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The EctHR’s position provides some clarity on the importance of using clear and 
explicit language in SC resolutions, and demonstrates that the SC’s intentions cannot 
be presumed.
 309
 This is especially in cases where the obligations arising from an SC 
Resolution could be interpreted to violate international law, and the purposes and 
principles of the UN Charter to which it is duty-bound.
310
 The EctHR judgement is 
persuasive and reliable since it emanates from an international court which helped to 
clarify international law, particularly the SC’s obligations in the UN Charter.  
 
The SC did not specify the removal of immunity of any officials in Resolution 1593 
but simply acknowledged the obligations of states under Article 98 (2) of the RS.
 311
 
Article 98 (2) of the RS prevents the ICC from issuing arrest warrants in respect of 
the officials of third parties with immunity. According to this provision, States 
Parties are also obligated to respect international agreements and immunity grounded 
within international law.
312
 Although the SC expressly obligated Sudan and the 
parties to the conflict to fully cooperate with the ICC and the Prosecutor, it did not 
mention CIL or immunity.
 313
  
 
The lack of specificity and precision in Resolution 1593 (2005) could suggest that 
immunity was not effectively abrogated. According to Wardle, President Al-Bashir’s 
immunity is still intact.
314
 At the vertical level, the ICC cannot prosecute him since 
immunity would bar the jurisdiction of the ICC in accordance with Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute.
 
 At the horizontal level, ie the relationship between states, states such 
as South Africa could also rely on Article 98 of the RS to justify non-compliance 
with the arrest warrant issued against President Al-Bashir.
 
 This is since Article 98 
(1) of the RS maintains that the ICC cannot issue warrants of arrest in cases where it 
would lead to the violation of immunities protected within international law.  
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Wardle argues that Sudan has prima facie a duty to arrest and surrender its President 
before the ICC.
315
 This obligation emanates from the SC Resolution where Sudan is 
mandated to ‘…cooperate fully …’ with the ICC. 316 However, because President Al-
Bashir’s immunity is not removed, Sudan can refrain from arresting and surrendering 
him before the ICC.
317
 Wardle also contends that other states do not have an 
obligation to comply with the ICC since the SC Resolution simply encourages 
compliance rather than obligating it.
318
  
 
The language used in the Resolution suggests that states other than Sudan and the 
parties to its conflict are merely ‘…urged…’ to cooperate with the ICC.319 Wardle’s 
argument is quite convincing but is yet to be supported by case law of the ICC or 
other courts. For this reason, caution needs to be exercised in relying upon his 
opinion entirely. The other perspectives on whether President Al-Bashir’s immunity 
was removed will be analysed further below. 
 
iii. The use of the Rome Statute to lift immunity 
Scholars such as Akande and Prost diverge from Wardle’s viewpoint. Prost asserts 
that explicit language is not necessary when the SC is acting under its Chapter VII 
powers.
320
 Prost contends that an SC decision which results in the abrogation of 
immunity can be valid without the need for explicit reference to its removal.
 321
 This 
is justified by reference to the UN Charter which does not necessitate explicit 
language in making SC decisions valid.
322
According to Prost, Sudan was placed in a 
position synonymous to that of a State Party to the Rome Statute through the SC 
referral.
323
 The use of the RS in the Al-Bashir case is confirmed by the ICC, in the 
arrest warrant and non-cooperation finding in the DRC judgement.
 324
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Akande echoes Prost and argues that Resolution 1593 (2005) conferred Sudan the 
status of a State Party to the Rome Statute.
325
 He also asserts, as does Prost, that 
Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute became applicable, which is a waiver of immunity 
applicable to States Parties.
326
 States Parties such as South Africa have a duty to 
comply with the decisions of the ICC such as the arrest warrants issued against 
President Al-Bashir.
327
 South Africa is therefore obligated to arrest and surrender 
President Al-Bashir,
328
 especially as the removal of immunity would make reliance 
on Article 98 of the RS impossible.
329
  
 
Sudan would have a duty to cooperate with the ICC and to arrest and surrender 
President Al-Bashir since it is placed in the position of a State party.
330
 However, 
other non-State Parties to the RS would have no obligation to arrest and surrender 
President Al-Bashir. These States do not have any obligations under the RS and 
Resolution 1593 simply ‘…urged…’ cooperation with the ICC, which is not a 
binding duty.
 331
  
  
The views of Akande and Prost are premised on the removal of immunity through 
the use of the RS.
 332
 The SC did not explicitly state that the ICC would apply the RS.  
It is logical to argue that the SC must have anticipated the application of the RS to 
the Al-Bashir case, because the ICC would not be able to apply any other law as the 
RS governs the functioning of the Court.
333
 Also, the Relationship Agreement 
between the SC and the ICC necessitates the use of the RS by the ICC to guarantee 
its independence.
334
  
 
However, it is questionable whether the SC intended for the ICC to apply the RS to 
the extremes of using this instrument to limit CIL, which grants immunity to 
incumbent heads of state. As previously discussed, subsection ii of this section, it is 
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necessary to use clear and specific language when SC Resolutions are interpreted in 
ways that constitute a significant departure from international law.
335 
However, the 
reasoning of Akande and Prost echoes the arguments made by the ICC in the DRC 
case in respect of using the RS to remove immunity making it persuasive.
336
 The 
difference lies in the ICC interpreting the language in the SC Resolution rather than 
using Article 27 (2) of the RS. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined and examined the referral mechanism which shows the role 
and influence of the SC in the ICC’s work. The scope of the SC’s exercise of its 
powers under Chapter VII was examined. Decisions adopted under its Chapter VII 
powers, for instance, take precedence over international agreements and sovereignty 
by virtue of its powers within the UN Charter.
337
 The SC also has extensive powers 
which enable the limitation of the sovereign rights of states such as the principle of 
state consent and possibly that of immunity.
338
 This shows that the maintenance of 
international peace and security, the objective of carrying out Chapter VII powers, is 
so vital that the SC is able to circumvent even widely recognized and respected 
principles in the pursuit of its objectives.  
 
However, the SC’s ability to restrict rules of CIL is questionable and unsettled. The 
foregoing analysis, the ICC’s and the differing opinions within academia, all indicate 
that whether Resolution 1593 (2005) effectively removed Al-Bashir’s immunity is 
contentious. It is a grey area which is interpreted in varying ways in academia and by 
the judiciary of the ICC. The SC’s competence to abrogate immunity is therefore 
subject to interpretation. Given this inconsistency it is difficult to establish the 
correct position. However, the ICC’s view is one where the SC is competent to lift 
immunity.
339
 This would make the SC’s involvement in the ICC imperative to its 
ability to adjudicate over cases involving third parties. This is evidenced by the 
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constraints posed by immunity grounded in CIL and Article 98 of the RS, analysed in 
Chapters Two and Three.  
 
If the SC can abrogate immunity, which is the view adopted by the ICC,
340
 it is 
doubtful whether it is lawful for the ICC to use the SC to undertake actions which it 
is not able to perform on its own. The analysis in this chapter has led to the 
conclusion that the SC is able to supersede the principle of state consent protected 
within international law.
341
 It is questionable whether States Parties to the Rome 
Statute are competent to limit state consent and possibly immunity through Article 
13 (b) of the RS. The legality of this provision will be examined in Chapter Four.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE LAW OF TREATIES AND THIRD PARTIES  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter will discuss the law of treaties within international law, particularly 
rules that have entered the corpus of CIL, with a view to depicting how treaties 
interact with and apply to third parties. This background will be used to examine 
whether Article 13 (b) of the RS, the treaty basis which enables the involvement of a 
third party in the work of the ICC, is lawful.
342
 This exploration will focus on the 
ICC’s competence to adopt a provision which uses third parties such as the SC to 
empower the Court to carry out functions which would otherwise be impossible 
under normal circumstances.  
 
First, the principle of state consent to the ICC’s jurisdiction will be examined; 
thereafter the law of treaties will be explored as it applies generally as well as in 
relation to third parties. The analysis will establish the legality of using Article 13 (b) 
of the RS to bind a third party and to circumvent international law including the 
principle of state consent and immunity. 
 
4.2 State Consent to the Jurisdiction of the ICC 
The principle of state consent is an important principle in international law which 
according to the ruling consent theory of international law is the cornerstone of the 
binding nature of international law.
343
 It is also intertwined with the principle of 
autonomy and sovereignty.
344
 These principles enable a state to determine the rights 
and obligations by which it will be legally bound.
345
 Sovereignty is a principle of 
international law possessed by all states in the international community.
346
 This 
section will discuss the principle of state consent in relation to the principle of 
sovereignty, and as a prerequisite for the exercise of the ICC’s jurisdiction as a 
treaty-based institution. 
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Consent to the jurisdiction of the ICC is important and is a precondition for the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction according to Article 12 of the RS.347 All three 
subparagraphs of this provision necessitate state consent. However, Article 12 of the 
RS appears to refer to States Parties to the Rome Statute and third states that have 
accepted the jurisdiction of the court in an ad hoc manner.
348
 This is implied by the 
language in the provision which refers to “[a] State which becomes a Party to this 
Statute…”, and is therefore legally bound to its provisions.349 Reference is also made 
to third states that are subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction by virtue of having lodged a 
declaration, thus accepting consent.
350
 State consent, in respect of SC referrals, is not 
regulated within Article 12 or other provisions in the Rome Statute. This signals its 
irrelevance in the context of SC referrals before the ICC, at least from the perspective 
of the Court. Some scholars even argue that SC referrals override the state consent 
that the ICC requires in order to have jurisdiction.
351
  
 
However, the Rome Statute should be consistent with rules and principles of the law 
of treaties because treaties are governed by international law, which includes the law 
of treaties.
352
 This is especially relevant in relation to the effect of treaties on third 
parties such as Sudan, seeing that state consent to be bound to a treaty is an important 
principle in the law of treaties and general international law.
 353
 The relevant rules in 
the law of treaties will be explored in the section that follows. 
 
4.3 The Law of Treaties  
Treaty law and the law of treaties are two distinguishable concepts with different 
meanings.
354
 The former relates to the rights and obligations arising from treaties 
while the latter refers to the body of law which applies to and regulates the working 
of treaties.
355
 This section will focus mainly on the law of treaties and its associated 
principles. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 
(VCLT), a treaty is ‘…an international agreement concluded between States in 
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written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation’. 356 A treaty is also intended to create rights and obligations for its 
parties.
357
 The Rome Statute fits the definition of a treaty as it was negotiated and 
concluded by states in order to create legally binding obligations and rights.
358
 As 
previously stated, this treaty should be compliant with the law of treaties which 
regulates the ‘operation of treaties’. 359 
 
The law of treaties and its associated principles are codified in the VCLT.
360
 This 
instrument is specifically relevant for using as a reference since most of its treaty 
provisions reflect CIL.
361
 This has been affirmed by the ICJ in a number of cases.
362
 
The ICJ cases specially affirm that Articles 26 to 28, 31 and 32 of the VCLT have 
attained the status of CIL.
363
 Scholars such as Lagerwall, David and Gautier also 
consider Articles 2(1), 34, 53 and 64 of the VCLT as reflecting customary 
status.
364
Lagerwall, David and Gautier cite case law from various international 
courts, which affirm the entry of the stated provisions into the corpus of CIL.
365
 This 
research project will narrow the scope of discussion to the aforementioned treaty 
provisions of the VCLT identified as CIL. Article 38 of the VCLT stipulating that 
                                                          
356
 Article 2 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). 
357
 Klabbers op cit note 12 at 55. 
358
 Cassese op cit note 14 at 340-3. 
359
 Thirlway op cit note 12 at 7. 
360
 Klabbers op cit note 12 at 38-39. 
361
 Thirlway op cit note 10 at 36; Karl Zemanek ‘Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: United 
Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law’, available at: 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/vclt/vclt-e.pdf, accessed on 13 March 2017 
 
362
 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007 ,para.160; Certain 
Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2008, para.124; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 
2010, para. 65 & 145; Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. 
Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 para. 100 & 113. 
 
363
 Ibid. 
 
 
364
 Anne Lagerwall  ‘Article 64: Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law 
(‘jus cogens’)’ in Olivier Corten & Pierre  Klein (eds)  The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: 
A Commentary Volume II (2011) 1465; Philippe Gautier ‘Article 2 Convention of 1986: Use of Terms’ 
in Olivier Corten & Pierre   Klein (eds)  The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 
Volume II (2011) 60; Eric David ‘Article 34 Convention of 1969: General Rule regarding third States’ in 
Olivier Corten & Pierre   Klein (eds)  The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary 
Volume II (2011)889-9. 
 
365
 Ibid. 
 
56 
 
treaty provisions which become CIL subsequent to the adoption of a treaty are 
binding on third parties, will also be referenced. This provision is not recognised as 
CIL but it simply states an obvious fact, namely, that states are bound by CIL, even if 
the CIL norm in question originated in a treaty.
366 
 
 
The RS should comply with the law of treaties particularly rules within the corpus of 
CIL and relating to third parties. This is because although states can contract out of 
certain rules of CIL by virtue of the adoption of a treaty opting out is only valid for 
States Parties rather than third parties.
367
Also, CIL can be used as a supplementary 
source for interpreting the RS and may be used where the treaty is silent.
 368
 The 
principle pacta sunt servanda codified in Article 26 of the VCLT stipulates that 
‘[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by 
them in good faith’. 369 It is a central element governing treaties,370 and applies to the 
performance and conclusion of treaties.
371
 This principle asserts that the provisions 
of a treaty are binding on its State Parties, suggesting that non-parties cannot be 
legally bound. This is confirmed by the principle of res inter alios acta nec nocet nec 
prodest which can be seen as an extension of pacta sunt servanda.
372
  
 
The principle of res inter alios acta nec nocet nec prodest, also expressed in Article 
34 of the VCLT, prohibits treaties concluded by States Parties from having third 
party effect, thereby excluding third party rights and obligations.
373
 This principle is 
expressed within Articles 34, 53 and 64 of the VCLT which stipulates that treaties 
should grant rights or set obligations on States Parties only, thereby excluding third 
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parties.
374
 This principle also encompasses the rule of the ‘relative effect’ of treaties, 
where a treaty is legally binding only on its State Parties rather than third parties.
375
 
 
From the foregoing, a treaty is res inter alios acta to non-State Parties and cannot 
bind third parties to its provisions.
376
 However, treaty provisions can be binding on 
third parties if they attain the status of jus cogens norms.
377
 The other methods of 
making treaties binding upon third parties will be explored further in the following 
section. 
 
4.4 The Law of Treaties and Third Parties 
The law of treaties especially as it applies to third parties will be analysed in this 
section. The previous section illustrated that the main principle which applies to and 
governs third party relations with a treaty is that of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec 
prosunt.
378
 However, treaties can bind third parties in certain cases. It has been 
demonstrated that treaty provisions can bind non-State Parties if they become part of 
CIL or attain jus cogens status.
379
 The ICJ has confirmed that treaty provisions can 
reflect CIL as well as emerging rules of CIL in the North Sea Continental Shelf and 
Nicaragua cases.
380
  
 
A treaty can also create obligations on third parties upon a state’s assent to the treaty 
as provided in Article 36 of the VCLT.
381
 Three conditions need to be fulfilled in 
order for a third state to be bound to a treaty: the state must assent to the treaty, must 
recognise and accept its obligations, and express the assent in writing.
382
 However, 
assent can also be presumed if a state acts in accordance with the obligations of a 
treaty and in cases where a treaty does not prescribe the means of expressing consent 
for third parties.
383
 These conditions echo those undertaken by States Parties to a 
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treaty since the third party also has to articulate its consent according to specific 
procedural requirements.
384
Also, the importance placed on the consent of the third 
state is similar to the prerequisite for States Parties to be bound to a treaty.
385
  
 
Article 13 (b) of the RS applies to third parties. It is questionable though, whether the 
provision complies with the law of treaties and falls into any of the aforementioned 
exceptions regulating this subject and third party relations. This will be explored in 
the next section. 
 
4.5 The Legality of Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute  
Article 13 (b) of the RS does not directly bind third parties. However, it does so 
indirectly by allowing for the SC to refer situations to the Court, including those 
from non-State Parties.
386
 This shows that the intent of this provision is to create 
obligations for third parties, since State Parties are already subject to and bound by 
the RS, therefore rendering Article 13 referrals of these states redundant. However, 
there is no evidence that the RS, specifically Article 13 (b) of the RS, falls within any 
of the aforementioned exceptions such as being part of jus cogens, CIL or allowing 
for assent by third parties. This is obvious since the ICC appears to rely on the SC as 
a basis of conferring its jurisdiction on non-State Parties.
 
With this approach, 
compliance with the law of treaties may be seen as unnecessary. Also, Article 13 (b) 
of the RS is not affirmed as falling within any of the aforementioned exceptions by 
the case law of the ICC, nor can this be inferred from the provisions of the RS. 
 
Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute is prima facie a violation of the principle of pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
 
where treaties cannot impose obligations on states that 
have not ratified a treaty.
387
 States are bound to respect rules of CIL, which should 
also include principles of the law of treaties, which have entered the corpus of 
CIL.
388
 These principles, aforementioned above, are codified in the VCLT which 
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attained the status of CIL.
389
 It is curious why States Parties could then do away with 
this obligation and create a treaty in violation of the law of treaties when acting as a 
body of State Parties during negotiations.  
 
State Parties to the ICC are not able to do together what they are unable to do 
individually, such as violating the law of treaties and head of state immunity, which 
are part of the corpus of CIL.
390
 Their decision to include a provision which would 
lead to the circumvention of CIL and other general principles of international law is 
questionable. The RS should comply with the law of treaties, particularly rules 
within the corpus of CIL and relating to third parties. Although States Parties to the 
RS can opt out of CIL through the treaty this is valid only between themselves as 
States Parties.
391
  
 
Article 13 (b) of the RS should not deviate from CIL to have third party effect. The 
deviation is inconsistent with the law of treaties and general international law.
 392
 The 
RS should therefore not grant rights and create obligations on third parties such as 
Sudan unless Article 13 (b) becomes part of CIL or jus cogens. The RS, including 
Article 13(b) is res inter alios acta to non-State Parties and cannot bind third parties 
such as Sudan to its provisions as provided within the law of treaties.
393
Article 13 (b) 
of the RS is therefore unlawful since it violates the law of treaties. This violation 
leads to other consequential violations of CIL such as head of state immunity in the 
case of Al-Bashir. Article 13 (b) of the RS is therefore arguably invalid. It becomes 
questionable whether the SC can refer cases to the ICC on the basis of a provision 
that is unlawful and violates the law of treaties as well as CIL.  
 
Article 13 (b) of the RS also cannot even be construed as beneficial to the SC. It does 
not confer any new power on the SC.
394
 It is in fact the ICC that is being empowered 
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by the SC.
395
 This is because that the SC derives its competence from the UN 
Charter, which is also regulated in the Relationship Agreement between the ICC and 
the UN.
396
 The treaty basis for referrals provided in Article 13 (b) of the RS benefits 
the ICC rather than the SC. The SC could derive some benefit in using the referral 
mechanism from a policy perspective since it would avoid setting up new criminal 
tribunals such as those of the ICTY and ICTR, which are costly.
397
 However, this 
advantage does not directly emanate from the RS.
 398
  
 
The practice of using a more powerful political body to bind third parties to 
obligations to which they have not consented sets an unwelcome precedent. This 
practice, even if it is adopted for the objective of maintaining and restoring 
international peace and security, goes beyond the scope of the UN Charter. Sudan 
and other Member States of the UN are deemed to have given consent to be bound to 
SC decisions owing to Article 25 of the UN Charter. However, Sudan could not have 
foreseen that ratifying the UN Charter would bring about obligations including being 
bound to the provisions of a treaty they had not ratified. Binding third states to a 
treaty goes beyond the scope of the UN Charter as this cannot be interpreted from its 
provisions. This action also cannot be regarded as directly advancing the 
maintenance of international peace and security, one of the main objectives of the 
UN according to its preamble and the UN purposes.
399
 Moreover, states primarily 
relinquished the competence to use force by ratifying the Charter but did not 
expressly do so in relation to the limitation of other sovereign rights.
400
  
 
The SC would need to find other methods of referring situations to the ICC for 
investigation and subsequent prosecution where appropriate. This could be possible 
if it relied on the Relationship Agreement between the UN and the ICC. This might 
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be a more appropriate legal basis for the SC to utilise. However, the utilisation of the 
Relationship Agreement could lead to difficulties. It is, for instance, debatable 
whether the ICC is able to deal with situations referred to it using the Relationship 
Agreement as a basis. The Rome Statute governs the jurisdiction and functioning of 
the ICC, which necessitates the inclusion of provisions relating to the referral 
mechanism procedure. A way to resolve such a problem could be through the 
amending of Article 2 of the RS, which stipulates the establishment of the 
Relationship Agreement. This provision could be amended to cross-reference the 
Relationship Agreement and the links between the ICC and the organs of the UN, 
such as the SC.  
 
However, the SC would also likely run into similar problems as occasioned by 
Article 13 (b) of the RS, through its use of the Relationship Agreement as a basis to 
refer situations to the ICC. The Relationship Agreement is technically not a treaty, as 
it is between two organisations rather than states.
401
 However, scholars such as 
Olufemi argue that the Relationship Agreement can be construed as a treaty.
402
 The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organizations or between International Organizations of 1986 (VCLTIO) also 
stipulates that treaties can be entered into between international organizations.
403
 
Although the VCLTIO is not yet in force, it mirrors Articles 1-72 of the VCLT of 
1969,
404
 which is considered as reflective of CIL.
405
  
 
The inclusion of a treaty provision on the conclusion of treaties between international 
organizations also demonstrates the ability of international organizations such as the 
UN and ICC to conclude treaties between themselves. The use of the Relationship 
Agreement, a treaty basis, could mean running into similar issues as those identified 
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in the case of Article 13 (b) of the RS. However, if international organisations can 
conclude treaties then it becomes questionable whether Sudan would still be 
considered as a third party, as it is a Member State of the UN.
406
 One could argue 
that the UN acts as a body which binds Member States to the agreements it concludes 
but this will not be discussed as it is beyond the scope of this paper.  
 
The above analysis illustrates that the use of the Relationship Agreement as a basis to 
refer situations to the ICC is a process with complex legal ramifications. The SC 
would do well to setup ad-hoc criminal tribunals, as was done in previous cases 
involving Yugoslavia and Rwanda. This would not be the most cost-effective way to 
proceed, but it would obviate the use of an unlawful and invalid provision such as 
Article 13 (b) of the RS, or other treaties such as the Relationship Agreement. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
Article 13 (b) of the RS violates principles within the law of treaties as well as CIL. 
This makes the provision unlawful since it infringes CIL and other principles of 
international law. States Parties to the Rome Statute negotiated the RS and provisions 
such as Article 13 (b), and should have ensured that the provisions complied with 
international law. The inclusion of a provision such as Article 13 (b) of the Rome 
Statute is an attempt to use a powerful third party such as the SC to circumvent rules 
and principles of international law. This includes circumvention, brought about 
through the application of Resolution 1593 (2005), of principles within the law of 
treaties as well as consequential violations of CIL such as immunity. 
 
As previously argued, this sets an unwelcome precedent where treaty-based 
institutions can bind third parties by virtue of a more powerful body such as the SC. 
This is not an acceptable development since treaty provisions that bind third parties 
in this manner are unlawful. The legally valid method of establishing new tribunals 
would be costly but necessary, in order to maintain legality in the SC’s use of a 
judicial organ to assist in the discharge of its mandate. 
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CHAPTER 5 CLOSING OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
5.1 Observations 
The relationship between a judicial organ and a political body leads to legal 
anomalies, which includes the violation of the law of treaties and head of state 
immunity, in the case of Al-Bashir. The removal of immunity by the SC is debatable, 
for instance, and one of the complications arising when a political body is included in 
the work of a judicial organ. The controversial and contentious nature of the referral 
has translated to diminished levels of cooperation by States Parties at the horizontal 
level.
407
 This contention is raised by attempting to bind third states to a treaty-based 
institution governed by a treaty, they have not ratified. 
 
Nevertheless, the linking of functions between a judicial organ and political body has 
the potential to end impunity as well as restoring international peace and security. 
This appears to be the belief of the SC and ICC, who refer to these objectives in the 
preamble of the SC resolution and that of the RS respectively. In principle, this is an 
honourable cause but its practical application is limited and leads to the problems 
previously identified. The use of Article 13 (b) of the RS, for instance, can lead to the 
prosecution of individuals from third states, but its treaty basis is unlawful, for the 
reasons set out in Chapter Four. These include its inconsistency with the law of 
treaties and its attempt to hinder the application of CIL with respect to third 
parties.
408
  
 
In addition, Article 13(b) of the RS has the potential to violate other rules of CIL as 
demonstrated in relation to the doctrine of immunity, especially that of incumbent 
heads of state. The demerits of this provision appear to outnumber the merits which 
emanate from its use. Its questionable legal standing reduces levels of compliance 
and its unlawfulness possibly leads to invalidity. The use of the Relationship 
Agreement could be a possible alternative but its use potentially leads to complex 
legal ramifications. It is difficult to reconcile the findings in order to map a way 
forward. The successive section will make suggestions for the problems that have 
been identified. 
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5.2 Recommendations 
The ICC should review Article 13 (b) of the RS in order to make it compliant with 
the law of treaties and to prevent its possible violation of CIL. The SC should use 
other means of enforcing its Chapter VII decisions rather than using Article 13 (b) of 
the RS, or basing decisions on the Relationship Agreement. From a policy 
perspective, the setting up of ad-hoc criminal tribunals, though not cost effective, is 
necessary given the apparent problems presented by the alternative. Cost-
effectiveness and economy will have to take a backseat to compliance with the law: 
the law of treaties and CIL. 
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